VT Code is designed with security as a first-class concern. This guide explains the security features, best practices, and how to configure VT Code for maximum safety in your environment.
VT Code implements a defense-in-depth security model with multiple layers of protection:
Only explicitly approved commands can execute. The allowlist includes:
ls- List directory contentscat- Display file contentscp- Copy fileshead- Display file beginningprintenv- Show environment variablespwd- Print working directoryrg- Ripgrep text searchsed- Stream editorwhich- Locate programs
All other commands are blocked by default, including:
- Destructive commands:
rm,dd,shred - Privilege escalation:
sudo,su,doas - System modification:
chmod,chown,systemctl - Network commands:
curl,wget,ssh - Container tools:
docker,kubectl
Each allowed command has a dedicated validator that:
- Validates all flags - Only explicitly allowed flags are permitted
- Blocks execution flags - Prevents
-exec,--pre,-e, etc. - Validates paths - Ensures all paths stay within workspace
- Rejects unknown flags - Unknown flags are blocked by default
Example: Ripgrep validation blocks dangerous preprocessor flags:
// BLOCKED: Preprocessor execution
rg --pre "bash -c 'malicious command'" pattern .
// ALLOWED: Safe search
rg -i -n pattern .All file operations are confined to the workspace:
- Path normalization - Resolves
..,., symlinks - Boundary enforcement - Rejects paths outside workspace
- Symlink resolution - Follows symlinks and validates destination
- Absolute path validation - Blocks absolute paths outside workspace
# BLOCKED: Path traversal
cat ../../../etc/passwd
# BLOCKED: Absolute path outside workspace
cat /etc/passwd
# ALLOWED: Workspace file
cat ./src/main.rsThree-tier approval system for tool execution:
- Approve Once - Single execution approval
- Allow for Session - Approved for current session only
- Always Allow - Permanently saved to tool policy
Prompt Injection Attacks
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Malicious prompts from users
-
Embedded prompts in code comments
-
Prompts in repository files
-
Prompts in logging output
Argument Injection
-
Execution flags (
-exec,--pre,-e) -
Path traversal (
../, symlinks) -
Output redirection (
-o /etc/passwd) -
Command chaining (
;,&&,||)Workspace Escape
-
Absolute paths outside workspace
-
Symlink traversal
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Parent directory traversal
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File-through-file traversal
Privilege Escalation
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sudo,su,doascommands -
System configuration modification
-
SUID binary exploitation
Physical Access - Assumes no physical access to machine
Kernel Exploits - Relies on OS security
Side Channel Attacks - Timing, cache, etc.
Social Engineering - Direct user manipulation
Configure tool approval policies in ~/.config/vtcode/tool_policy.toml:
# Allow specific tools without prompting
[tools]
read_file = "allow"
list_directory = "allow"
search_files = "allow"
# Require approval for sensitive operations
run_pty_cmd = "prompt"
write_file = "prompt"
delete_file = "prompt"
# Block dangerous operations
bash = "deny"The execution policy is enforced at the code level and cannot be disabled. However, you can configure workspace boundaries:
[workspace]
# Workspace root (default: current directory)
root = "/path/to/project"
# Additional allowed paths (use with caution)
# allowed_paths = ["/tmp/vtcode-cache"]-
Review Tool Approvals
- Check
~/.config/vtcode/tool_policy.tomlregularly - Use "Approve Once" for unfamiliar operations
- Only use "Always Allow" for trusted tools
- Check
-
Be Cautious with Untrusted Content
- Don't process code from unknown sources
- Review prompts in repository files
- Be wary of code comments with instructions
-
Monitor Command Execution
- Review logs in
.vtcode/logs/ - Watch for suspicious patterns
- Report unusual behavior
- Review logs in
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Centralized Policy Management
- Deploy standard tool policies
- Use deny-by-default approach
- Regular policy reviews
-
Audit and Monitoring
- Centralized log collection
- Automated anomaly detection
- Incident response procedures
-
Security Training
- Educate users on prompt injection
- Share security best practices
- Regular security updates
VT Code includes comprehensive security tests:
# Run security test suite
cargo test -p vtcode-core --test execpolicy_security_tests
# Run all tests
cargo test --workspaceTest security controls with malicious prompts:
# Test argument injection
vtcode ask "Search using rg --pre 'bash' for pattern"
# Test path traversal
vtcode ask "Show me ../../../etc/passwd"
# Test command chaining
vtcode ask "List files then curl evil.com"All of these should be blocked with appropriate error messages.
If you discover a security vulnerability:
- Do Not Disclose Publicly - Report privately first
- Contact Maintainers - Open a security advisory on GitHub
- Provide Details - Include reproduction steps
- Allow Time for Fix - Coordinate disclosure timeline
Stay informed about security updates:
- Watch the GitHub repository
- Review CHANGELOG.md for security fixes
- Subscribe to release notifications
- Security Model - Complete security architecture
- Security Audit - Vulnerability analysis
- Tool Policies - Command execution policies
- CWE-88: Argument Injection
- OWASP Command Injection
VT Code's security model is informed by:
- Trail of Bits research on AI agent security
- Anthropic's safety guidelines
- OpenAI Codex execution policy
- Industry best practices for command execution
Last Updated: October 25, 2025
Security Model Version: 1.0